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Damages for Unlawful Strikes
Under the Railway Labor Act
By DENNIS ALAN AROUCA*
To promote collective bargaining and to facilitate industrial
peace,' the Railway Labor Act (RLA or Act) enumerates the
rights and duties of labor and management in the rails and airline
4
* B.A., 1974, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; J.D., 1977, Temple University
School of Law. Member, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania Bars.
1. "The federal interest that is fostered [by the Railway Labor Act] is to see that
disagreement about [working] conditions does not reach the point of interfering with inter-
state commerce." Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6
(1942).
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
3. The Act applies to any railroad carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, any
express company, sleeping car company, and any company directly or indirectly owned or
controlled by a rail carrier that performs services in connection with the transportation,
receipt, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration or icing, storage, and handling of property
transported by railroad. Id. § 151 First. The Act has been held to cover state owned and
operated railroads engaged in interstate commerce, see California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553
(1957); a state port authority operating a terminal railroad at a seaport, see International
Longshoremen's Ass'n v. North Carolina Ports Auth., 463 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 982 (1972); a package express company, see Itasca Lodge 2029, Ry. Clerks v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 391 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1968); a public authority operating a railroad
and elevators on harbor docks, see United Indus. Workers of the Seafarers Int'l Union v.
Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965); and a wholly owned
subsidiary of a railroad performing loading, unloading, and highway services in connection
with trailer on flat car service by the railroad, if that subsidiary is not certificated as a motor
carrier under the Interstate Commerce Act, see Holston Land Co., 5 N.M.B. 307 (1975).
4. In 1936, the RLA was amended to cover "common carrier[s] by air engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce" and "carrier[s] by air transporting mail for or under contract
with the United States Government." 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1976). The Act has been applied to
foreign flag air carriers operating in the United States, see Burke v. Compania Mexicana de
Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970), and to a company operating, servicing, and
storing aircraft at a county airport, see International Aviation Serv. of N.Y., Inc., 189
N.L.R.B. 15 (1971). The evolution of commercial and operational relationships in today's
transportation marketplace has resulted in the extension of carrier status by the National
Mediation Board to companies supplying services to traditional rail and air carriers where
the work performed by those companies traditionally has been considered to be integral to
rail and air transportation. See Ground Serv., Inc., 8 N.M.B. No. 35 (1980); Delpro, Inc., 8
N.M.B. No. 2, aff'd, 8 N.M.B. No. 16 (1980); Missouri-Illinois Cent. Indus., Inc., 7 N.M.B.
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industries. The Act imposes mutual obligations on both labor and
management not to resort to economic action until each has com-
plied with the Act's detailed procedures. Labor thus has a duty
not to strike,5 and management may not lock out employees or
unilaterally change rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.,
To protect labor's rights, the courts have awarded compensa-
tory damages to unions and employees for a carrier's violation of
the Act.7 Management, on the other hand, rarely has been awarded
damages for a union's violation of the Act. During the fifty-four
years since the RLA was enacted, the courts have failed to develop
a clear framework for awarding damages to carriers injured by un-
lawful strikes, partly because the Act lacks an express remedy for
damages."
The deregulation of the rail and air transportation industries
may result in market-induced displacements in these industries.9
No. 256 (1980); Boeing Airport Equipment, Inc., 7 N.M.B. No. 193 (1980).
5. "The strike, which has been described abstractly as a form of collective. .. action,
may be more specifically characterized as a concerted and temporary suspension of function,
designed to exert pressure upon others within the same social unit - industrial, political, or
cultural . . . . From this collective nature the strike derives its power of coercion." E.
HILLER, THE STRIKE: A STUDY IN CoLCLucm ACTION 12 (1928).
6. A carrier's obligation to bargain under § 6 of the RLA extends to "rates of pay,
rules, and working conditions," 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1976), as compared to the obligation of an
employer under § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1976), to bargain over "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment." Al-
though similar, the scope of bargaining under the RLA has been considered more extensive
than that under the NLRA. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 362 U.S.
330, 338 (1960); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B. R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 601
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968); Weberi Public Policy and the Scope of
Collective Bargaining, 13 LAB. L.J. 49, 68 (1962). But see Japan Air Lines v. IAM, 538 F.2d
46 (2d Cir. 1976); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 459 F. Supp. 136
(W.D. Va. 1978).
7. See, e.g., Bangor & A. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,
442 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (violation of § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1976)); Burke v. Compania
Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970); United Indus. Workers of the
Seafarers Int'l Union v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 400 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969); Adams v. Federal Express Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1356
(W.D. Tenn. 1979) (violations of § 2 Third and Fourth, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Third, Fourth
(1976)).
8. Suits to enforce collective bargaining agreement no-strike clauses negotiated under
the NLRA may be brought in federal courts pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). See text accompanying notes 145-54 infra.
Section 301 does not apply to collective bargaining agreements negotiated under the RLA.
See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. United Transp. Union, 471 F.2d 8, 9 (6th
Cir. 1972); Corbin v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 939, 942 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
9. Labor opponents to airline deregulation characterize it as an "unsettling factor" in
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These displacements may strain labor-management relations and
cause labor to resort to economic pressure to preserve threatened
job security. The availability of a damages remedy to carriers
under the RLA thus probably will have special importance in the
near future.10
labor management relations, focusing on the alleged "irreparable harm" to employee job
security resulting from anticipated predatory actions by stronger carriers forcing weaker
carriers out of particular markets, or out of business altogether. Labor foresees massive lay-
offs and domination of the industry by a few giant carriers. See Kahn, Airlines, in COLLEC-
Tv BARGAINING: CoNTEMPORARY AmERicAN EXPERIENCE 320, 337-38 (G. Sommers ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Kahn]; Deregulation Impact on Labor Management Relations, [1979]
102 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 15-17. Employee protection provided by statute and regulation,
see note 10 infra, is described as inadequate because the threshold for qualification is too
high (reduction of 72 % in a carrier's full-time workforce within a 12 month period) and
because airlines can avoid unionization and collective bargaining by transferring operations
into new markets and by contracting out work. Deregulation Impact on Labor Management
Relations, [1979] 102 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 15-17.
Deregulation of the rail industry may present similar job security issues as excess ca-
pacity in the industry is eliminated. Railroads may withdraw from particular markets by
abandoning lines or increasing rates to better cover costs, thereby possibly diverting traffic
to rail, truck, water, or air transport competitors. See id. See generally Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on S. 1946, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
536-44 (1979) (statement of J.R. Snyder, Chairman, Legislative Committee, Railway Labor
Executives Association). Rail labor will seek to avoid these adverse effects .through hard
bargaining and through traditional governmental protection schemes. Deregulation Impact
on Labor Management Relations, [1979] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 15-17.
10. Certain aspects of economic regulation of the air transportation industry were re-
moved from the control of the Civil Aeronautics Board by the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified at scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). The
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895, similarly extended some pricing
flexibility and freedom to enter or exit particular markets to the rail industry. The Airline
Deregulation Act provides for the first time a comprehensive system of earnings protection
and job security for airline employees who are adversely affected by major contractions in
the industry. See S. REP. No. 95-631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. RaP. No. 95-1211,
95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3737, 3762;
H.R. REP. No. 95-1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3733. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 19,146 (1979) (proposed regulations). The Act passed
despite opposition from organized labor. Kahn, supra note 9, at 337-38. Employee protec-
tion has been commonplace in the railroad industry since 1936 and has been provided for by
the Civil Aeronautics Board in airline consolidations from time to time. See generally Davis,
Sherwood & Jones, An Estimate of Labor Protection Cost in Selected Railway Consolida-
tions, 43 ICC PRAc. J. 56 (1975); Lieb, A Review of the Federal Role in Transportation
Labor Protection, 45 ICC PRAc. J. 333 (1978); Murray, A New Look at Rail Employee
Merger Protection, Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Nemitz: An Assessment, 24 CASE W.L. REV. 103
(1972); Ris, Government Protection of Transportation Employees: Sound Policy or Costly
Precedent?, 44 J. Am. L. & CoM. 509 (1979); Comment, Protection for Employees Adversely
Affected by Railway Mergers: Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Nemitz, 13 ARiz. L. REv.
703 (1971).
For a discussion of the volatility of rail and air industrial relations, see Kahn, supra
note 9. See generally H. LEViNsON, C. RsHMus, J. GOLDBERG & M. KAHN, COLLECTIVE BAR-
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This Article examines the courts' enforcement of the no-strike
duties of the RLA and concludes that a damages remedy should be
implied in the Act to ensure remedial balance between the carrier's
no-strike expectation and labor's reciprocal expectation of stable
working conditions.1' An application of the judicially developed
test for implying a damages remedy for violation of a federal stat-
ute to the Act's no-strike provisions demonstrates the propriety of
allowing damages to carriers under the Act. By fostering mutual
responsibility in labor-management relations, and thereby promot-
ing the goals of collective bargaining legislation, a damages remedy
is consistent with national labor policy. If a damages remedy is not
available to carriers, the statutory right to uninterrupted opera-
tions, a cornerstone of the congressional scheme, may prove to be
illusory.
The Railway Labor Act's No-Strike Obligation
A major purpose of the RLA is to provide a statutory proce-
dure to prevent strikes.'2 The "General Purposes" of the Act in-
GAINING & TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION (1971).
11. This Article articulates an analytical framework for implying a damages remedy on
behalf of rail and air carriers but does not discuss the standards by which labor union liabil-
ity is to be measured, either with respect to actions by union officers or agents, see Ramsey
v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302, 309 (1970); UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 741 (1966); United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 401 n.4 (1947); with respect tQ the international,
regional, or local nature of the activity, see Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212, 217-18
(1979); or with respect to the mass action of its members, see United States Steel Corp. v.
UMW, 598 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1979); Carbon Fuel Co. v.-UMW, 582 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir.
1978), aff'd, 444 U.S. 212 (1979); Republic Steel Corp. v. UMW, 570 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1978);
Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Local 1104, 496 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974). Also beyond the scope of
this Article is whether damages may be recovered from individual employees, an issue of
some present controversy under the LMRA, which the Supreme Court may soon review. See
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F.2d 1110 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W.
3263 (1980). See also Certain-Teed Corp. v. United Steelworkers, Local 37A, 484 F. Supp.
726 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 429 F. Supp. 445 (N.D.
Ohio 1977).
12. See Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 565 (1930). See
also Detroit & T.S. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148 n.13 (1969).
Congress described the no-strike obligation as the employer's chief incentive to enter
into, and primary advantage to be gained from, a collective bargaining agreement. See S.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947) (accompanying the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947). Accord, Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d
951, 960 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976); Spelfogel, Enforcement of No
Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Actions and Discipline, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Ray.
239 (1966). According to Professor Feller, although the right to uninterrupted operation is
indeed important, it is not the only important benefit gained by an employer through a
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clude the following goals:
(1) to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of
any carrier engaged therein... (4) to provide for the prompt and
orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules or
working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly set-
tlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions.13
To prevent strikes by securing the voluntary resolution of dis-
putes, the Act imposes various reciprocal obligations upon rail and
air carriers, their employees, and the employees' representatives.
The first obligation, imposed by section 2 First of the Act, requires
labor and management to "exert every reasonable effort to make
and maintain agreements... in order to avoid any interruption to
commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein. 14
The Supreme Court has construed this obligation to impose a no-
strike duty on labor until all efforts at settlement have been
exhausted.1
collective bargaining agreement. The employer also gains a system for the formulation and
administration of rules to govern the business enterprise, which Feller describes as a prereq-
uisite for the management of an industrial concern. See Feller, A General Theory of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAwn. L. Rav. 663, 764-71 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Feller]. This observation is particularly appropriate in the rail and air transportation indus-
tries because the no-strike duty, the obligation that management and labor "exert every
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements," and the mechanism for the interpreta-
tion or application of agreements, including governmentally funded arbitration, already are
mandated expressly in the Act. See notes 24-29 infra. For a theoretical discussion of the role
of rules in managing an industrial organization, see J. DUNLoP, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYS-
TEMs (1958).
13. 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1976).
14. Id. § 152 First.
15. See Detroit & T.S. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1969).
This duty, characterized by the Court as "the heart of the Railway Labor Act," Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1969), is similar to the
obligation under the NLRA to bargain in good faith, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), but has
been construed as imposing a higher standard than merely good faith bargaining by man-
agement and labor. Japan Air Lines v. IAM, 389 F. Supp. 27, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 538
F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1976). The RLA does not compel agreement between labor and manage-
ment, but "does command those preliminary steps without which no agreement can be
reached." Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937). Compliance
with § 2 First is measured by the "whole of the party's conduct at the bargaining table,"
Japan Air Lines v. IAM, 389 F. Supp. at 34, and may include evaluation of the historical
experience and context of collective bargaining between the parties. Atlantic C. R.R. v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 262 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 383
F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1047 (1968). Violations of § 2 First include
maintaining an abrasive bargaining posture, see Erie Lackawanna Ry. v. Lighter Captains,
Local 996, 338 F. Supp. 955 (D.N.J. 1972); discussion of procedural rather than substantive
RAILWAY LABORMarch 1981]
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The general obligation imposed by section 2 First to exert rea-
sonable efforts to make and maintain agreements is made specific
by the Act's provisions dealing with the making and administering
of agreements. First, a no-strike obligation arises out of the major
dispute procedures of the Act, under which agreements governing
rates of pay, rules, and working conditions are negotiated.'6 Eco-
nomic action, such as a strike, is unlawful until those procedures of
the Act calling for negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration,
and possible presidential intervention through an Emergency
Board, have been exhausted. 17 Although these procedures have
been characterized as "almost interminable," 18 they "are purposely
long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and practical
issues at the bargaining table, see Atlanta & W.P. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 307 F.
Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971);
and utilization of union policies-to disrupt negotiations, see Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air
Line Pilots Ass'n, 416 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 926 (1970).
16. 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, 155, 156, 157, 160 (1976).
17. See Detroit & T.S. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1969). The
major dispute procedures of the RLA are well summarized in Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378 (1969): "A party desiring to effect a
change of rates of pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice. § 6.
The parties must confer, § 2 Second, and if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or
both may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its
services sua sponte if it finds a labor emergency to exist. § 5 First. If mediation fails, the
Board must endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration,
which can take place, however, only if both consent. §§ 5 First, 7. If arbitration is rejected
and the dispute threatens substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree sucii as
to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation
Board shall notify the President, who may create an emergency board to investigate and
report on the dispute. § 10. While the dispute is working its way through these stages,
neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo. §§ 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10." Mainte-
nance of the "status quo" requires that neither labor nor management make any changes in
the current rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. The carrier may not unilaterally pro-
mulgate new rates of pay, work rules, or other conditions of employment Labor may not
engage in any economic action in support of its bargaining goals, including strikes. Id.
In summarizing the industrial relations theory of the major dispute procedures, the Su-
preme Court described the RLA's status quo requirement as "central to its design .... Its
immediate effect is to prevent the union from striking and management from doing any-
thing that would justify a strike. In the long run, delaying the time when the parties can
resort to self-help provides time for tempers to cool, helps create an atmosphere in which
rational bargaining can occur, and permits the forces of public opinion to be mobilized in
favor of a settlement without a strike or a lockout. Moreover, since disputes usually arise
when one party wants to change the status quo without undue delay, the power which the
Act gives the other party to preserve the status quo for a prolonged period will frequently
make it worthwhile for the moving party to compromise with the interests of the other side
and thus reach agreement without interruption to commerce." Detroit & T.S. R.R. v. United
Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 150 (1969).
18. Detroit & T.S. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149 (1969).
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considerations will provide in time an agreement that resolves the
dispute." 19 These procedures, however, are intended only to pre-
serve the status quo until negotiation has failed. Resort to eco-
nomic warfare thus is postponed, not eliminated. 0
The duty imposed by section 2 First to exert every reasonable
effort to resolve disputes and avoid interruptions to a carrier's op-
eration also is made specific in the procedures of section 2 Ninth21
for designation of representatives by the National Mediation
Board. These procedures are exclusive; economic action to secure
recognition or to organize employees is proscribed by the Act2 2 re-
gardless of whether the Mediation Board's procedures have been
invoked.2
A no-strike obligation also arises under section 3 of the Act,
which requires compulsory adjustment or arbitration of all griev-
ances or other minor disputes arising out of the interpretation or
application of agreements.2 4 "Minor disputes" generally are consid-
ered to be controversies over the meaning of an existing collective
bargaining agreement or employment practice in a particular fact
19. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 246 (1966). See
note 17 supra.
20. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 379
(1969). See also Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 372 U.S. 284
(1963) (the carrier may make unilateral changes after exhaustion of the Act's major dispute
procedures). The rule of Baltimore is not unlimited, see Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Flor-
ida E. Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238 (1966), although the scope of self-help allowed management
or labor under the Act is unclear. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 394 U.S. 369, 391 (1969).
During the 1950's and 1960's, commentators criticized the procedures of the RLA as
insufficient to accomplish industrial peace, in large part because parties had failed to negoti-
ate seriously until the Presidential Emergency Board issued its report. Various proposals,
including mandatory interest arbitration, were suggested. See generally CoMMITTM FOR
ECONOMIc DvaLOnPMENT, THE PUBLIC INTREsT IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 104-06 (1961);
Curtin, National Emergency Disputes Legislation: Its Needs and Its Prospects in the
Transportation Industries, 55 Gso. L.J. 786 (1967); Wisehart, Transportation Strike Con-
trol Legislation: A Congressional Challenge, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1697 (1968); Emergency
Public Interest Protection Act of 1971, Message from the President, 117 CONG. REc. 1536
(Feb. 3, 1971). Although the Act remained unchanged, the 1970's were relatively free from
major interruptions to commerce. In addition, recent Presidential Emergency Boards have
taken an activist role in negotiating settlements between the parties, after issuing recom-
mendations. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOABD (1978); ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD (1977).
21. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth (1976).
22. See Summit Airlines, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 295, 628 F.2d 787, 795 (2d Cir. 1980).
23. Id.
24. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1976). See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.
R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 39 (1957).
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situation. If labor and management fail to resolve these disputes,
in the rail industry they must be submitted to the National Rail-
road Adjustment Board (NRAB) for "final and binding determina-
tion;"25 these disputes are resolved by system or regional boards of
adjustment in the airline industry. 6 In contrast, "major disputes"
involve attempts to secure new conditions of employment through
the collective bargaining process. 27  At first, the courts held that
25. Section 3 First of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1976), provides that "minor
disputes" are to be handled in the ordinary course up to and including the chief operating
officer assigned to review and resolve the dispute. If the dispute is not successfully resolved,
it may be submitted by the employee, his or her representative, or the rail carrier to the
NRAB for a "final and binding determination." Id. § 153 First (m). If the appropriate divi-
sion of the NRAB is unable to adjust the dispute, it is submitted to a neutral "referee"
selected by the division or the National Mediation Board. Id. § 153 First (k), (1), (n).
The NRAB was hailed as a great advance in the resolution of railroad labor disputes.
See generally Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administra-
tive Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567 (1937). The NRAB docket became so crowded in later years
that, in 1966, Congress amended § 3 Second to establish "public law boards" to relieve the
congestion at the NRAB. See Pub. L. No. 89-456, §§ 1-2, 80 Stat. 208. The two bodies are
virtually identical in jurisdiction as public law boards are empowered "to resolve disputes
otherwise referable to the [NRAB]." 45 U.S.C. § 153 Second (1976).
In addition to being statutorily required, grievance arbitration in the rail industry is
unique in that the costs of arbitration are underwritten by the United States Government, a
factor that some commentators contend has resulted in overuse of arbitration and a conse-
quent lack of discipline on the part of both labor and management in the grievance adjust-
ment process. See THE RAILWAY LABOR Aar AT 50 ch. IX (C. Rehmus ed. 1976); Northrup,
The Railway Labor Act: A Critical Reappraisal, 25 INus. & LAB. REL. REv. 3, 21-22
(1971).
26. Although § 3 of the RLA does not extend to the airline industry, the courts have
construed the 1936 amendment of the Act, which provides for system or regional boards of
adjustment for that industry, to prescribe mandatory arbitration of minor disputes. See
]AM v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963). For a discussion of minor dispute adjust-
ment in the airline industry, see Hill, Looking Back at Airline Grievance Procedures and
System Boards: A Critical Appraisal, 35 J. Am L. & CoM. 338 (1969); Kahn, Airline Griev-
ance Procedures: Some Observations and Questions, 35 J. Am L. & CoM. 313 (1969);
Schwartz, Grievance and Adjustment Board Procedures in the Airline Industry as a Rea-
sonable Alternative to Strikes, 35 J. Am L. & CoM. 324 (1969).
27. The Supreme Court has distinguished the two types of disputes as follows: "The
first [major disputes] relates to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or ef-
forts to secure them. They arise where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to
change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement con-
trols the controversy. They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion
of rights claimed to have vested in the past. The second class [minor disputes], however,
contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a
situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a
new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular
provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case. In the latter event the
claim is founded upon some incident of the employment relation, or asserted one, indepen-
dent of those covered by the collective agreement, e.g., claims on account of personal inju-
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there was an implied duty not to strike only while a minor dispute
was pending before the NRAB. 28 Later, some courts extended the
no-strike duty implied in section 3 to prevent strikes over any mi-
nor dispute, regardless of whether it had been submitted for ad-
justment or arbitration, 9 or whether an award had been issued. 0
The courts have yet to define the lawful boundaries of other
forms of economic action such as sympathy strikes, area standards
picketing, and secondary pressure. Assessing the propriety of such
conduct under the RLA requires balancing the Act's interest in
continuous transportation services with the employees' right to se-
cure improved working conditions through self-help.81
ries. In either case the claim is to rights accrued, not merely to have new ones created for
the future." Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-24 (1945). See also McGuinn,
Injunctive Powers of the Federal Courts in Cases Involving Disputes Under the Railway
Labor Act, 50 GEo. L.J. 46 (1961).
28. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
29. See, e.g., Manion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 353 U.S. 927 (1957); Itasca Lodge
2029 Ry. Clerks v. Railway Express Agency, 391 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1968); Brotherhood of
R.R. Carmen v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 354 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1965); Louisville & N. R.R. v.
Brown, 252 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949 (1958). The Supreme Court's
decision in Chicago River, implying a no-strike obligation in a statutory mandatory arbitra-
tion provision, was extended in 1962 to matters governed by the NLRA when the Court
implied a no-strike obligation in a collective bargaining agreement arbitration provision, en-
forceable by a suit for damages for breach of contract under § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1976), Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), and in 1974 to a
corrollary mandatory arbitration requirement in a collective bargaining agreement no-strike
clause. Gateway Coal v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
The Supreme Court has accepted the proposition that arbitration is the quid pro quo
for labor's relinquishment of the right to strike, rather than merely an alternative form of
litigation. Feller, supra note 12, at 714 n.252. This form of contractual consideration also
was present in 1934 when labor and management negotiated the amendment of the RLA to
provide for compulsory adjustment of minor disputes under § 3. See Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Chicago River & L R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 34-39 (1957).
30. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Louisville & N. R.R., 373 U.S. 33 (1963).
31. For a discussion of sympathy strikes, compare Trans Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3515
(1981), with Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots As'n Int'l, 442 F.2d 251 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. International Ass'n of
Machinists, 442 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1970); Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Work-
ers, 425 F.2d 1086 (1970), reaff'd, 443 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1971); and Chicago Transp. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 99 L.R.R.M. 3072 (N.D. Ill. 1978). For a discussion of secondary
pressure, see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369
(1969); Western M. R.R. v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 465 F. Supp. 963 (D. Md. 1979);
Southern Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 458 F. Supp. 1189 (D.S.C. 1978); Terminal
R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 458 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Chicago Transp.
Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 99 L.R.R.M. 3072 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Consolidated Rail Corp.
v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 99 L.R.R.M. 2607 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Alton & S. Ry. v. Brother-
hood of Ry. Clerks, 99 L.R.R.M. 2323 (D.D.C. 1978). All of these cases involve accommodat-
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Enforcement of the No-Strike Obligation
The RLA, with a few minor exceptions, 2 does not provide an
express right of action to enforce its substantive provisions. The
courts thus were compelled to imply a private right of action on
behalf of labor and management to enforce the Act's duties and
obligations.3 3 Once the courts established this implied right .of ac-
ing the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act with the RLA dispute resolu-
tion procedures and policies. For further discussion of this accommodation principle, see
note 52 infra.
32. Section 2 Tenth, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Tenth (1976), provides for criminal enforcement
of a willful violation of § 2 Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, or Eighth. Section 3 First (q), id.
§ 153 First (q), provides for enforcement of Adjustment Board awards. Section 7 Third (h),
id. § 157 Third (h), prescribes enforcement of the subpoena power of interest arbitration
boards. Section 9, id. § 159, provides for enforcement of interest arbitration awards.
33. The first case to present this issue to the Supreme Court was Texas & N.O. R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 565 (1930). Although the Court did not clothe its
discussion of judicial enforceability of RLA duties in terms of a private right of action, it
observed later that that is what it meant. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.17
(1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 & n.13 (1979). The Supreme
Court may have misconstrued the procedural posture of Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co.
when it referred to its action in that case as implying a private right of action. Texas &
New Orleans Railroad Co. was a suit in equity, brought before the merger of law and equity
in the federal courts. See note 39 infra. The concept of a right of action founded upon a
statutory violation has its origin in the common law rather than in equity. See Texas & P.
Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). As will be discussed, the merger of law and equity
gives such distinctions limited utility.
In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court concluded that several factors
were relevant in determining whether a private right of action is implied in a federal statute
which fails expressly to provide for one: "First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted'--that is, does the statute create a federal right in
favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or im-
plicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?...
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law.. . ." Id. at 78
(citations omitted). The Supreme Court recently refined these criteria. In Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Court concluded that whether an implied private
right of action exists is a matter of statutory construction. Relying on a number of RLA
cases, the Court concluded that the "right" or "duty" creating language of the statute has
been the most accurate indicator of whether a private right of action should be implied. Id.
at 690-93 & n.13. A private right of action will be implied where the language of the statute
confers a right directly on a class of persons that includes the plaintiff in the case. Accord,
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1979). Furthermore, where a private
right of action is necessary, or at least helpful to accomplishing the statutory purpose, the
Supreme Court will be "decidedly receptive" to its implication under the statute. 441 U.S.
at 703.
Frequently, federal statutes will not be clear on their face regarding the availability of
private rights of action, and the courts must look beyond the mere language of the statute.
In those cases, the Supreme Court has held that congressional intent is the dispositive in-
quiry. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). If it is clear
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tion, they had to determine what remedies should be available to
enforce that right. " As the Court stated in Davis v. Passman,35
"the question of whether a litigant has a 'cause of action' is ana-
lytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a
litigant may be entitled to receive."3 6
The courts were first presented with the question of what rem-
edies should be available to enforce the Act quite soon after its
enactment. In Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood
of Railway and Steamship Clerks,17 the carrier argued that the
Act provided no penalties for violating section 2 Third, which pro-
hibits an employer from interfering with the employee's selection
of representatives, 8 and therefore that the provision was unen-
forceable. The Court summarily dismissed this contention,
reasoning:
The absence of penalty is not controlling. The creation of a legal
right by language suitable to that end does not require for its ef-
fectiveness the imposition of statutory penalties. Many rights are
enforced for which no statutory penalties are provided. In the
case of the statute in question, there is an absence of penalty, in
the sense of specially prescribed punishment, with respect to the
arbitral awards and the prohibition of change in conditions pend-
ing the investigation and report of an emergency board, but in
each instance a legal obligation is created and the statutory re-
that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action, the Cort v. Ash factors will
not be applied. Id. Accord, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
34. "The law of judicial remedies concerns itself with the nature and scope of relief to
be given a plaintiff once he has followed appropriate procedures in court and has established
a substantive right. The law of remedies is thus sharply distinguished from the law of sub-
stance and procedure." D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF RlmmMs § 1.1 (1973) [herein-
after cited as DoBS].
35. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
36. Id. at 239. Justice Brennan described the separate inquiries involved in this deter-
mination: "Thus it may be said that jurisdiction is a question of whether a federal court
has the power, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, to hear a case;...
standing is a question of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a defendant to create
an Art. III case or controversy, or at least to overcome prudential limitations on federal-
court jurisdiction; . . .cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a
member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the
power of the court; and relief is a question of the various remedies a federal court may make
available. A plaintiff may have a cause of action even though he be entitled to no relief at
all, as, for example, when a plaintiff sues for declaratory or injunctive relief although his
case does not fulfill the 'preconditions' for such equitable remedies." Id. at 239-40 n.18
(citations omitted).
37. 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
38. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Third (1976).
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quirements are susceptible of enforcement by proceedings ap-
propriate to each. The same is true of the prohibition of interfer-
ence or coercion in connection with the choice of representatives.
The right is created and the remedy exists.39
The remedial scheme by which the judiciary enforces the
RLA's no-strike duties includes the power to issue injunctions
against labor,4" notwithstanding the prohibitions of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act.41 The judiciary's desire for remedial flexibility also
39. 281 U.S. at 569-70 (emphasis added). The "arbitral awards" to which the Supreme
Court was referring are the result of voluntary interest arbitration under § 7 of the RLA, 45
U.S.C. § 157 (1976), enforceable in the courts pursuant to §§ 8 and 9, id. §§ 158-159, as
opposed to grievance arbitration under § 3. The judicial enforceability of grievance arbitra-
tion awards under § 3 was not added to the Act until 1934, see Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Chicago River & I. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957), and therefore was not part of the Su-
preme Court's consideration of the case in Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. in 1930. The
history of interest arbitration under the Act is detailed in THE RAILWAY LABOR ACr AT 50,
ch. V (C. Rehmus ed. 1976). For a discussion of the enforceability of interest arbitration
awards under § 7, see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B. R.R., 385 F.2d 581
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chi-
cago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 380 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 298 (1967);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 380 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 940 (1967); Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307
F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963); Order of Railway Conductors v.
Clinchfield R.R., 278 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Tenn. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 407 F.2d 985
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 841 (1969).
Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. arose prior to the merger of law and equity in the
federal courts, and the relief sought and awarded therein was limited to an injunction. The
question of damages, a remedy traditionally available only "at law," was not an issue. See
generally DOBBS, supra note 34. Nevertheless, the Court employed broad language embrac-
ing all remedies necessary to enforce RLA obligations and did not distinguish between rem-
edies for actions at law or equity.
40. With respect to § 2 First and the major dispute resolution procedures of §§ 2, 5, 6,
and 10, see Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 573 (1971).
See also Japan Air Lines Co. v. IAM, 389 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd, 538 F.2d 46 (2d
Cir. 1976). With respect to minor disputes, see Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.
R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 33 (1957). See also cases cited at note 29 supra. With respect to recogni-
tional disputes, see Summit Airlines, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 295, 628 F.2d 787, 795 (2d Cir.
1980).
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). The Norris-LaGuardia Act generally limits the power
of a federal court to issue an injunction in any case arising out of a labor dispute as defined
by that Act. It does not, however, deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin non-
compliance with the various mandates of the RLA. The two Acts must be harmonized be-
cause each was adopted as part of a pattern of national labor legislation. LAM v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 772-73 (1961). See also Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402
U.S. 570, 581-82 (1971). If no RLA duty has been breached, however, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act may preclude injunctive relief. Compare Federal Express Corp. v. Teamsters Local 85,
617 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1980), with Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union, 425 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1970), reaff'd, 443 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1971). For a discussion of
the accommodation principle and the policy of the two acts, see Perritt, Am I My Brother's
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has resulted in damages awards to employees when, for example,
the carrier denies representation rights under section 2 Third and
Fourth42 or union shop protection under section 2 Eleventh.43
Damages also have been awarded against unions in cases in
which employees seek redress for a union's violation of its duty of
fair representation. In both Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road Co.44 and Turnstall v. Locomotive Firemen, Ocean Lodge
76,"5 the Supreme Court held that union members whose interests
had not been represented fairly by their unions could seek the
"usual judicial remedies of injunction and award of damages,
where appropriate."'
46
Little precedent exists, however, to support recovery of dam-
ages by carriers against unions. In Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men, Enterprise Lodge 27 v. Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad
Co.,' 7 the Supreme Court refused to uphold a district court's in-
junction against a strike because the major dispute resolution pro-
cedures of the Act had been exhausted. 48 The Court, however, re-
jected the carrier's contention that failure to approve injunctive
relief left the carrier without remedy, noting in dicta that "[o]ther
means of protection remain. Suits for recovery of damages still
may be brought in the federal courts, when federal jurisdiction is
shown to exist.' 49 The Court also seemed implicitly to recognize
Keeper? Secondary Picketing Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 68 GEo. L.J. 1191 (1980).
42. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Third, Fourth (1976). See Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Avia-
cion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970); Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87
(3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969); Adams v. Federal Express Corp., 470 F.
Supp. 1356 (W.D. Tenn. 1979).
43. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1976). See Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d
87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969). Section 2 Eleventh permits union shop
provisions in collective agreements under the RLA whereby all employees in a craft or class
must become members of the organization certified to represent that craft or class. The
section limits the remedies for the certified representatives to discharge from the carrier's
employ only for employee nonpayment of dues. See also Burke v. Compania Mexicana de
Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1970); Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244
F. Supp. 820, 822-23 (D. Del. 1965), af/'d, 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1048 (1969). Accord, Adams v. Federal Express Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1356, 1361-62 (W.D.
Tenn. 1979).
44. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
45. 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
46. Steele, 323 U.S. at 207. See also Turnstall, 323 U.S. at 213-14.
47. 321 U.S. 50, 63 (1944).
48. Id. at 63-65. The Norris-LaGuardia Act barred injunctive relief because the RLA
procedures were not being enforced by the Court.
49. Id. at 63.
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the availability of damages for the carrier to remedy a violation 6f
the minor dispute no-strike duty under section 3 of the Act in
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen,50 which upheld a judgment for damages en-
tered by the district court judge against a labor union for a
strike.51 Only a venue issue was appealed to the Supreme Court,
and, therefore, the Court did not address squarely whether dam-
ages was an appropriate remedy under the Act. The Court did dis-
cuss the background of the case prior to proceeding to the venue
question, however, and therefore, it is likely that the Court was.
aware that the lower court found the strike illegal and that dam-
ages had been awarded based on the carrier's lost traffic. The
Court's failure to comment on the lower court's award of damages
thus arguably may be considered an implicit acceptance of the
principle that the courts should enforce obligations of the RLA
with whatever means are appropriate on a case by case basis.52
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
the first court to address specifically whether a carrier may secure
damages for a strike in violation of sections 2 First and 3 of the
Act. In Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Brown,5 3 the court
reffised to allow the carrier to recover damages after a cursory re-
view of the Act's express terms:
Where Congress sought to set up a right of action for damages for
breach of duty in other management labor situations, it enacted a
statute expressly spelling out the nature of the right of action.
See 29 U.S.C.A. Section 187, and so also in creating a right of
action in the civil rights field. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986. We
do not think that Congress here intended to or did create a new
statutory right of action for damages [under the RLA].5
50. 387 U.S. 556 (1967).
51. See 58 L.R.R.M. 2568 (D. Colo. 1966).
52. See text accompanying notes 32-46 supra.
53. 252 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949 (1958).
54. 252 F.2d at 155. The court of appeals did permit tort claims against individual
employees who participated in the unlawful strike to proceed on two state law theo-
ries-inducement -of breach of contract and conspiracy to prevent the employer from carry-
ing on its lawful business. Id. at 155-56: The current vitality of Brown is suspect in view of
recent cases preventing the bypass of the minor dispute procedures of the RLA by filing
complaints sounding in tort. See Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972);
Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 413 F. Supp. 870 (D. Mont. 1976), afl'd, 576 F.2d 1367 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978). Also, state courts must apply federal law when
considering cases arising under the RLA. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380-82 (1969).
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Following Brown under the principle of stare decisis, a Florida dis-
trict court in National Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Association,
International,5 held that an award of compensatory damages was
beyond "the permissible scope of Section 2 First remedies.""8 The
court reasoned:
[T]o create a right of action in favor of an employer against a
union and its collective bargaining representatives for the losses
the former incurs in the course of the collective bargaining pro-
cess, would, in effect, give the employer a weapon with which to
keep the unions and their agents "in line.
'57
For a number of compelling reasons, the Fifth Circuit's refusal
to allow damages to carriers for union violation of sections 2 First
and 3 does not withstand close scrutiny. First, the court ignored
the implication of a damages remedy for breach of the RLA's duty
of fair representation, notwithstanding the lack of such a remedy
in the statute.8 Second, a major underpinning of the rationale set
forth in Brown has been eliminated. The court's reliance upon the
analogous unavailability of damages in the civil rights context has
been largely undercut, if not eliminated, by the Supreme Court's
later holding that all remedies are available in the courts to redress
deprivation of civil rights.59 Third, the court's reliance on the ab-
sence of any provision in the RLA correlative to section 303 of the
LMRA,60 which authorizes employer damages for injuries caused
by secondary pressure, is misplaced. The court ignored section 301
of the LMRA which grants jurisdiction in the state and the federal
courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements negotiated pur-
suant to the NLRA. Although section 301 does not specify appro-
55. 431 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
56. Id. at 54.
57. Id. The district court was of the opinion that the policy considerations underlying
Brown continued to be valid. The volatility of labor-management relations made it inequita-
ble for management to take advantage of labor by collecting damages for unlawful conduct.
The district court opinion is inconsistent with national labor policy, however, because that
policy favors mutual responsibility at the bargaining table. See text accompanying notes
138-40 infra.
58. See notes 32-33 & accompanying text supra.
59. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). For a discussion of
Sullivan, see text accompanying notes 83, 85 infra.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). Section 303 authorizes suits for the recovery of damages to
be brought in federal courts for injuries sustained as a result of secondary pressure unlawful
under § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. For a general discussion of secondary pressure and its regula-
tion by national labor laws, see Perritt, Am I My Brother's Keeper? Secondary Picketing
Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 68 Gao. L.J. 1191 (1980).
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priate remedies in such actions, the courts have implied the availa-
bility of all remedies, including damages, necessary to enforce the
section. The rationale for doing so is substantially similar to that
used to imply all such remedies to enforce the RLA.e1 Finally, one
of the premises of Brown and National Airlines was that to allow a
new type of recovery might upset a perceived fragile economic bal-
ance between labor and management.e2 As labor has grown
stronger, however, particularly in the rail and airline industries, a
new damages remedy might in fact restore an economic balance
between the two. Thus, the only cases to consider expressly the
damages remedy, Brown and its offspring, National Airlines, now
may be of dubious analytical value. The cases that seem to support
the availability of damages did not discuss the basis for that rem-
edy. A framework for the award of damages for breach of the Rail-
way Labor Act's no-strike duty has yet to be constructed.
Mutual Obligations as the Basis for Mutual
Remedies
In contrast to the result in Brown, the Fifth Circuit has had
little trouble implying damages under the RLA in favor of unions
and their members. In United Industrial Workers of the Seafarers
International Union v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves,e"
the court awarded damages in the form of back pay because the
carrier changed the status quo prior to having exhausted the major
dispute procedures of the Act. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
such a remedy was the only "fair and practicable" remedy to re-
turn the employees to the same position that they would have been
in if the carrier had not violated the Act." The District of Colum-
61. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). See also
notes 147-50 & accompanying text infra.
62. 431 F. Supp. at 54 (discussing the policy considerations underlying Brown).
63. 400 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969).
64. 400 F.2d at 326. Accord, Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 416 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir.
1968). See also United Transp. Union v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 586 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1978).
The court in United Transportation granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
in an action for damages and injunctive relief brought against the carrier for an alleged
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Despite holding for the defendant, the court in
dicta implied that Galveston Wharves was a sound decision, stating: "Galveston Wharves
did not create a 'cause of action.' It merely expanded the scope of relief which could be
awarded for violations of the Act.... While prior case law made it appear unlikely that
money damages could be recovered, it did not preclude a prayer for money damages, nor bar
any other relief plaintiff may have been entitled to. If the contrary were so, the Galveston
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bia Circuit also has upheld a damages remedy for unlawful changes
of the status quo by the carrier. In Bangor and Aroostook Rail-
road v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen,6s the
court, without discussing Brown, awarded damages to a labor
union in the form of lost dues for the carrier's change in conditions
of employment prior to exhausting the major dispute procedures of
the RLA.e8
Ironically, in sidestepping the broad language of Brown, the
Fifth Circuit advanced the argument for implying a damages rem-
edy for the carrier.67 Although in Galveston Wharves and Bangor
and Aroostook Railroad, damages were recovered by employees or
labor unions, rather than carriers, the awards were based on the
carrier's duties imposed by the RLA, duties which are reciprocal to
the employees' obligation not to strike.
The Supreme Court has observed that the reciprocal nature of
these RLA obligations is central to the design of the Act and is
necessary to make the Act's procedures work.68 In Detroit & To-
ledo Shore Line Railroad Co. v. United Transportation Union,6 9
the Court held that the reciprocal status quo obligation extended
beyond written agreements to include all working conditions.70 Al-
Wharves case could not have been decided." Id. at 528. It is not certain whether the court
was approving damages for a mere breach of the collective bargaining agreement, in which
case the minor dispute procedures of the Act may oust the court of jurisdiction, or because
that breach was an unlawful change in the status quo under § 6 of the Act. See id. at 525-26.
65. 442 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
66. The carrier had reduced unilaterally the staffing of its trains. The court found that
if proper staffing had taken place, the carrier would have had to hire additional employees.
Because of the "union shop" provision in the collective bargaining agreement, the lost dues
were the damages sustained by the plaintiff union which the court granted to make the
union whole. Id. at 822-23.
67. To a lesser extent the same is true of the District of Columbia Circuit, although
Brown was not discussed by the court in Bangor & Aroostook Railroad. See notes 64-66 &
accompanying text supra.
68. See Detroit & T.S. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 150-53 (1969);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & L R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 34 (1957). The
industrial relations theory underlying the status quo duty, as described by the Supreme
Court, is set forth at note 17 supra.
69. 396 U.S. 142 (1969).
70. Id. at 150-53. Labor and management have reciprocal obligations not to change
"those actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived, which were in
effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which are involved in or related to
that dispute." Id. This duty has been extended to working conditions of sufficient standing
to constitute "practices" between the parties. See United Transp. Local 31 v. St. Paul Union
Depot Co., 434 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1970); District 146, IAM v. Taca Int'l Airlines, 467 F.
Supp. 441 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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though the controversy in Toledo Shore Line arose out of the car-
rier's unilateral change in working conditions, the court's construc-
tion of the status quo obligation applied expressly to both labor
and management.1 If the status quo obligation and the corre-
sponding rights it extends to both labor and management is recip-
rocal and coterminous, it should be similarly enforced against both
labor and management. Without a balanced enforcement scheme,
the rights of labor and management contained in the status quo
obligation lose their reciprocity with consequential adverse effects
on the labor policy that underlies the obligation.
The adverse effects of an unbalanced remedial structure on
the enforcement of reciprocal obligations were examined when the
Supreme Court discussed the appropriateness of injunctive relief
to enforce a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement.
Under the LMRA, collective bargaining agreement no-strike and
arbitration clauses impose coterminous obligations upon labor and
management.7 2 In the early case of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkin-
son, however, the Supreme Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act precluded a federal district court from enjoining a strike in
breach of a collective bargaining agreement no-strike clause, even
though the reciprocal arbitration obligation was enforceable
against management by that remedial device.73 Eight years later
the Court reviewed the remedial structure for enforcement of col-
lective agreement no-strike and arbitration obligations in Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770.74 Because the remedial
imbalance in favor of labor had created an unsatisfactory environ-
ment for labor relations,75 the Supreme Court approved using the
71. 396 U.S. at 153.
72. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1974); Local 174, Teamsters
v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 449 (1957);
Delawaie Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 326, 624 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1980). Cf.
W-I Canteen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1979) (explaining that the parties
can alter coterminous obligations by contract). See also Feller, supra note 12, at 755-60. In
fact, one obligation is implied from the other. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368,
381-82 (1974); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962).
73. 370 U.S. 195, 198 (1962).
74. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
75. The Court's earlier holding in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195
(1962), reduced employer incentive to secure no-strike clauses in collective agreements.
These incentives had "devastating implications" for the federal labor policy of encouraging
peaceful adjustment of industrial disputes according to voluntarily agreed to procedures.
398 U.S. at 247-49.
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injunction to enforce a no-strike clause in a collective agreement.
The Court sought to encourage negotiation of no-strike clauses and
to promote the peaceful adjustment of industrial disputes by con-
sensual procedures,7  notwithstanding the anti-injunction provi-
sions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Thus, the courts approved
the general proposition that reciprocal rights deserve reciprocal
remedies, at least in the context of granting injunctions.
In a sense, the Galveston Wharves, Bangor and Aroostook,
and Florida East Coast Railway courts did not have such a formi-
dable hurdle as the Norris-LaGuardia Act to surmount when ap-
proving the award of damages to employees and unions under the
RLA, yet each court recognized the reciprocal nature of the status
quo duty under the Act and its importance to the statutory
scheme.78 Just as the no-strike and arbitration obligations of the
LMRA, the reciprocal status quo obligation of the RLA deserves a
remedial structure capable of sustaining the reciprocal rights con-
tained in that obligation. If damages are unavailable to a carrier
when such a remedy is available to its employees and their repre-
sentatives, this asymmetry may frustrate the proper exercise of du-
ties and responsibilities by management and labor and may under-
mine collective bargaining, as was observed in Boys Markets.9
Judicial Implication of a Damages Remedy for
Breach of Federal Statutory Duties
Because of the inconclusive nature of the judicial treatment of
76. 398 U.S. at 252-53. Accord, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397,
407 (1976).
77. 398 U.S. at 252. The Court applied the accommodation principle first announced
in Chicago River to give effect to later expressions of national labor policy. See note 41 &
accompanying text supra.
78. See United Transp. Union v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 586 F.2d 520, 525-26 (5th Cir.
1978); Bangor & A. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 442 F.2d 812, 822-23 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); United Indus. Workers of the Seafarers Int'l Union v. Board of Trustees of Gal-
veston Wharves, 400 F.2d 320, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969).
79. 398 U.S. at 247-49. See note 75 & accompanying text supra. See also IBEW v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 (1979). Professor Feller has commented that failure by the courts to
understand fully the role of collective bargaining and labor-management relations has re-
sulted in the courts fashioning inappropriate remedies for breaches of duties arising out of
the collective bargaining process. See Feller, supra note 12, at 665, 772-73. Collective bar-
gaining properly may be considered as encompassing all aspects of labor-management inter-
action, including negotiation of basic labor agreements, grievance procedure, and day to day
dialogue. W. Sisan , MEDinoN Aim Tm DYmcs OF COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING 6 (1971).
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the issue of the availability of damages for strikes in violation of
the RLA, general principles for implying a damages remedy under
a federal statute must be examined to resolve the question whether
a damages remedy is available to carriers under the RLA. In Bell v.
Hood,s0 the Supreme Court implied a remedy for damages in a suit
against federal officials for violations of the fourth and fifth
amendments, relying in part upon Texas & New Orleans Railroad
Co.8' The court in Bell held:
Where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been
the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust
their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also
well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a fed-
eral statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done.
82
Subsequently, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Inc.,as the Court
used broad language in permitting both an injunction and recovery
of damages for violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1867.84 The
Court relied in part upon Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co.'s
construction of the RLA for its conclusion that "[tihe existence of
a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appro-
priate remedies."8 5
Recently in Davis v. Passman,as the Supreme Court tempered
this broad statement, reasoning that because Congress establishes
statutory rights, Congress may regulate both who may enforce stat-
utory rights and the manner by which these rights may be en-
forced. 7 The Court in Davis emphasized that the failure of Con-
80. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
81. See notes 38-39 & accompanying text supra.
82. 327 U.S. at 684 (emphasis added).
83. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
85. 396 U.S. at 239 (citing Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)). Ac-
cord, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964). See generally 2A D. SANDS, STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 55.03 (4th ed. 1973).
86. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
87. Id. at 241 (implied right of action and remedy of damages under fifth amendment
for employment discrimination by a United States Congressman). Accord, Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979).
Once a court assumes jurisdiction over a cause of action, it possesses the inherent judi-
cial power to fashion and afford effective relief. Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 349 (M.D.
Tenn.), on remand from 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Accord, Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 156
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 342
U.S. 908 (1952). This power, however, is limited by Congress' powers under article III, § I of
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gress expressly to consider a particular remedy for violation of a
statute is not inconsistent with an intent to make such a remedy
available. The intent may appear implicitly in the language or
structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enactment.88
The Supreme Court thus has tended to allow the enforcement
of federal rights through any appropriate remedy, unless there is
afforded some special immunity"9 or express congressional expres-
sion to the contrary.90 Characterizing the implication of remedies
under Bell as "established law,"91 the Court in Davis described
damages as a "remedial mechanism normally available in the fed-
eral courts."9 2 If congressional intent is not clear, the Court held
the Constitution to regulate the jurisdiction and remedies available in the federal courts,
other than the Supreme Court. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943). For an exam-
ple of this regulation in the context of a labor dispute, see the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976), which severely restricts the remedy of an injunction in the federal
courts. See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1938). Congress' authority to
reguilate the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in turn is limited by constitutional due
process limitations. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948). See also Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. Rav. 1362 (1953); Redish
& Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A
Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1975).
88. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979).
89. In Davis, the Court observed that the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 6, cl. 1, may restrict judicial review of congressional employment decisions. 442 U.S. at 235
n.11 & 246. 4
90. In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), the Supreme
Court considered whether a private litigant could recover damages under the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 806-1 to -21 (1976). In examining whether damages may
be awarded for statutory violations, the Court stated that the dispositive inquiry "is
whether Congress intended to create [such a] private remedy." 444 U.S. at 15. Analyzing the
indicia of congressional intent, the Court held that a private action for damages was not
available because, in light of the comprehensive enforcement scheme of the Investment Ad-
visors Act of 1940, it was "highly improbable" that Congress forgot to provide a remedy for
damages. Id. at 20. Moreover, the Court noted the express provision for private suits for
damages under other securities regulation statutes, concluding that Congress did not intend
the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to add to the panoply of remedies. Id. at 20-21. In
contrast, there is no corresponding statutory or regulatory scheme under the RLA labor-
management relations scheme.
91. 442 U.S. at 295.
92. Id. at 248. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971) (implied private right of action and damages remedy for violation of fourth
amendment by federal agents).
In a concurring opinion in Bivens, Justice Harlan rejected the contention that a dam-
ages remedy should not be available absent express congressional authorization, reasoning
that whenever a federally protected interest is involved, the federal courts have the inherent
power and ability to determine which of the "traditionally available" judicial remedies, in-
cluding damages, is necessary to effectuate the substantive provisions of the federal statutes.
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that the inquiry in determining whether to imply a damages rem-
edy is whether that remedy is appropriate to the legal principle at
issue. The appropriateness of damages depends on three factors:
(1) whether they historically have been awarded in situations of
the type before the court;" (2) whether awarding damages is "judi-
cially manageable;"95 and (3) whether equitable relief alone would
be insufficient to enforce the statutory right.98 Once each of these
inquiries have been answered affirmatively, the plaintiff may re-
cover damages upon proving his or her case.9
Congressional Intent to Provide a Damages Remedy
An examination of the legislative history is the first step in
determining whether a damages remedy should be implied. This
inquiry is important, if not dispositive, 8 in ascertaining whether
Id. at 402-03 n.4 (Harlan, J., concurring). Remedies are merely the means of carrying into
effect a substantive legal principle and should be fashioned to match the policy inherent in
the principle at issue. See generally DOBBS, supra note 34, § 1.2. See also Note, Federal
Jurisdiction in Suits for Damages Under Statutes not Affording Such Remedy, 48 CoLum.
L. REV. 1090 (1948); Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
HAnv. L. REv. 285, 297-98 (1963).
93. 442 U.S. at 245.
94. Id.
95. Id. With respect to whether damages are "judicially manageable," the Court was
concerned that there be no difficult questions of evaluation or causation, a traditional in-
quiry with respect to damages. See generally DOBBs, supra note 34, § 3.1 -.3.
96. 442 U.S. at 245. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI, 403 U.S.
388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 662
(1963) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (damages awarded for breach of statutory duty where it
affords the only practicable remedy to redress the wrong).
97. One may speculate that Justice Harlan would have agreed with this proposition,
with the addition that damages may be awarded by the courts for violation of statutory
duties when they are "necessary and appropriate" to effectuate statutory policy. See Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI, 403 U.S. 388,406 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan's analysis is remarkably similar to the Court's later description of its general
role in administering the RLA "to implement a remedial scheme that will best effectuate
the purposes of the Railway Labor Act, recognizing that the overarching legislative goal is to
facilitate collective bargaining and to achieve industrial peace." IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42,
47 (1979). This concept of congruity between the right and remedy is not explicitly dis-
cussed in the majority opinions in Bivens and Davis.
98. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1979). In
Transamerica, congressional intent was dispositive on the issue of availability of damages.
In Davis, there was a presumption that a damages remedy exists, absent congressional ex-
pression to the contrary. This difference may be explained by the fact that the Transamer-
ica Court was considering federal statutory rights, while the Davis Court was considering
federal constitutional rights. In Davis, the court was mindful of the traditional role of the
judiciary to safeguard constitutional rights based on its inherent judicial power, including
fashioning appropriate relief among traditional judicial remedies. 442 U.S. at 241-42. See
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damages are available for breach of federal statutory duties.
The legislative history of the RLA indicates that Congress was
not totally silent concerning the mechanisms for enforcement of
the obligations imposed by the Act. In its report on the RLA, the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce com-
mented: "[t]here are also legal obligations which would be ac-
cepted by and imposed upon the the parties by the proposed law
Ito be enforced by the] judicial power of the government in the
settlement of industrial controversies .... "9,1
The legislative history also indicates that rail labor expressly
anticipated that the judicial power to enforce the' RLA would be
exercised in whatever fashion was necessary and appropriate.
Donald R. Richberg, a spokesman for rail labor at the congres-
sional hearings on the bill in 1926, addressed the remedies issue a
number of times during his testimony.100 With respect to the duty
imposed by section 2 First, Mr. Richberg stated:
[9]o far as this law stated duties imposed upon the parties by act
of Congress, if they failed to live up to their duties, and there was
any action which a court could take consistent with the judicial
powers and its limitations, to compel the enforcement of that
duty as a legal obligation, it would be subject to enforcement. But
the law for such enforcement or compulsion should be developed
in the courts, according to the old common law theory of letting
the court develop the law after the obligations are clearly under-
stood, rather than to write into the law a specific line of penal-
ties and writs of enforcement.10'
Rail labor thus anticipated that judicial enforcement could in-
clude sanctions.10 Mr. Richberg, discussing the remedies for alter-
note 87 supra.
99. H.R. REP. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Ses. 1-2 (1926) (emphasis added).
100. Although the courts view testimony warily in ascertaining legislative intent, the
Supreme Court often has acknowledged that the RLA was an agreement worked out be-
tween labor and management, and ratified by Congress and the President. As such, state-
merits of the spokespersons for those parties are entitled to considerable weight in the con-
struction of the Act. See Chicago & Nw. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 576
(1971); Detroit & T.S. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 151 n.18, 152 n.19, 153
n.20. (1969).
101. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R.
7180, 69th Cong., 1st. Sess. 40 (1926) (statement of Donald R. Richberg) (emphasis added).
See also id. at 91 (further discussion of the availability of common law remedies).
102. "I do not think that the courts have held ... that when .Congress imposes the
duty in the interests of the public that a party can go out and arbitrarily violate that duty
just because Congress does not always fix a penalty of fine or imprisonment... I think
that a duty imposed by law is enforceable by judicial power." Id. at 85.
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ing the status quo prior to exhausting the major dispute proce-
dures of the RLA, stated that such changes in the status quo
"would be subject to the strongest form of judicial compulsion to
prevent any such action."10
The legislative history thus indicates that the framers of the
RLA intended to leave development of remedies to the courts in
the same way that remedies had developed at common law.'"
This could include an award of damages, a traditional common law
remedy. The use of the word "compulsion"1 e5 in the legislative his-
103. Id. at 45. Other statements in the legislative history also support the conclusion
that all remedies, including damages, were assumed by Congress to be available to enforce
the no-strike provisions of the RLA. At the House Hearings, the following interchange took
place:
"Mr. Hoch [member of the House Committee]: I am trying to get your interpretation
as a possible guide to the interpretation by the court, if the situation should arise.
"Mr. Richberg: I am trying to meet that .... Now, I have said very clearly, and I want
to repeat it, that I have no question but that [the Railway Labor Act] imposes the obliga-
tion not to carry on any strike movement, not to call a strike - that is, not to have the men
suspend work. . . ." Id. at 277.
Earlier in the same hearing, Mr. Richberg stated: "[I]nasmuch as the enforcement of
any legislation rests with the courts, it can hardly be held, particularly as no specific provi-
sion is made in here for judicial enforcement - it can hardly be held that this legislation in
any way coerces the court, inasmuch as it simply puts upon the court ... the obligation to
carry out, so far as it is possible, a public policy declared by Congress." Id. at 75 (emphasis
added).
These expressions of legislative intent were not limited to the House of Representatives.
During Senate consideration of the Railway Labor bill, Senator William C. Bruce of Mary-
land noted that labor's right to strike, while postponed until exhaustion of procedures, was
preserved, "subject, of course, to the rights of the courts to address any abuses involving
violations or what not resulting from strikes. . . ." See Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Interstate Commerce on S. 2306, 69th Cong., 1st. Sess. 25 (1926).
The Supreme Court relied upon Mr. Richberg's testimony in Chicago & Nw. Ry. v.
United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 573 (1971), in which the Court concluded that § 2 First of
the Railway Labor Act was enforceable by the courts "by whatever appropriate means may
be developed on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 576-77. The legislative history reveals similar
treatment was intended for the minor dispute resolution procedures of the Act. See Broth-
erhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 36-40 (1957).
104. See generally DOBBS, supra note 34, §§ 3.1-.9 (1973). See also Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
105. Compulsion at common law connoted forcible inducement to the commission of
an act. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 260 (5th ed. 1979). See also United States v. Kimball, 117
F. 156, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1902). In ecclesiastical procedure, a compulsory was a kind of a
writ compelling the attendance of a witness to undergo examination. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 260 (5th ed. 1979). The framers of the RLA, however, intended to make compliance
with the Act's procedures compulsory rather than voluntary, as had been the case in earlier
legislative attempts to regulate industrial relations in the rail industry. See note 106 infra.
The framers also may have been influenced by common law treatment of agreements to
arbitrate as revocable at any time. See DoBBs, supra note 34, § 12.27.
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tory, however, may undercut this assumption. In the historical
context of the RLA, where labor and management were seeking to
impose legally enforceable duties on each other for the first time,106
one might conclude that "the compulsion" contemplated was in-
junctive relief alone. There is no express suggestion in the legisla-
tive history, however, that compliance with the RLA procedures
could be effected solely by injunctions. Rather, the framers fa-
vored the multiple remedial approach available at common law.
The remedial device of sanctions to secure compliance with the
Act's obligations was anticipated specifically by rail labor. Thus, on
balance, it is appropriate to conclude that labor and management
were willing to leave enforcement of the Act to the courts on a case
by case basis, according to commonly accepted legal principles.
107
The Appropriateness of a Damages Remedy
In addition to passing master under an inquiry into legislative
intent to determine whether damages are available for violating
the RLA's no-strike duties, a court must inquire whether such a
remedy is "appropriate." To be considered appropriate, damages
traditionally must have been awarded in this context. This require-
ment appears to have been met. In the one case awarding damages
to a carrier, damages were awarded for the carrier's lost traffic dur-
106. The RLA was not the first attempt at enacting legislation to govern industrial
relations in the railroad industry. The progression of legislation began with the Arbitration
Act of 1888, ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501 (repealed ch. 370, § 12, 30 Stat. 428 (1898)), and contin-
ued with the Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (repealed ch. 6, § 11, 38 Stat. 108
(1913)); the Newlands Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (repealed ch. 347, § 14, 44 Stat. 587
(1926)); the Adamson Act of 1916, ch. 436, 39 Stat. 721 (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 65-
66 (1976)), and the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 300-16, 41 Stat. 469 (repealed ch.
347, § 14, 44 Stat. 587 (1926)). Each of these Acts offered various forms of governmental
mediation or recommendation, and voluntary arbitration for the adjustments of disputes
between labor and management and avoidance of interruption to commerce. The hallmark
of each, however, was reliance on public opinion to enforce compliance. This proved to be
insufficient and, coupled with the determination by the Supreme Court that the decisions of
arbitration boards established under the Transportation Act of 1920 were not enforceable
by the courts, see Pennsylvania R.R. Sys. No. 90 v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S. 203, 216-17
(1925); Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States R.R., 261 U.S. 72, 84 (1923), was the bellweather
for the RLA, through which labor and management agreed to judicially enforceable duties
and obligations. For more on this historical development, see IAM v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
755-58 (1961); General Comm. of Adjustment of the Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-
Kansas-Texas R.R., 320 U.S. 323, 328 n.3 (1943); Loomis, Railway Labor Law-Practices
and Problems, 16 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 747 (1949). For an historian's description of the early days
of rail industry labor relations, see G. EGGERT, RAILROAD LABOR DisPuTEs (1967).
107. See notes 101-03 & accompanying text supra.
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ing the unlawful strike.0 8 Damages have also been awarded to la-
bor for breaches of other RLA duties.109
Examination of federal law in analogous areas also is helpful
in testing the appropriateness of a damages remedy.110 Under sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA, suits for breach of collective bargaining
agreements negotiated under the NLRA may be brought. In these
cases, damages have been awarded to employers for strikes in vio-
lation of collective bargaining agreement no-strike obligations."'
In addition, under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act (LMRDA), the courts have developed a damages remedy
for union members injured by a union's violation of the members'
"bill of rights."11 2 Damages have been awarded under a compensa-
tory theory, allowing recovery of all damages proximately flowing
from the union's wrongful conduct. 13
108. Denver & R.G.W. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 58 L.R.R.M. 2568 (D.
Colo. 1965).
109. See notes 101-03 & accompanying text supra.
110. See, eg., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979) (Supreme Court looked to
remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), in
determining that damages could be awarded for sex discrimination in violation of the fifth
amendment).
111. See notes 116-20 & accompanying text infra.
112. See LMRDA, §§ 101-102, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-412 (1976). Section 102 created a
right of action in federal courts for "such relief (including injunction) as may be appropri-
ate." Id.
113. See, e.g., Simmons v. Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965);
International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 315 (9th Cir. 1965); McCraw v.
Plumbing Indus., 341 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1965); Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local
802, 241 F. Supp. 895, 905-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Labor unions also may be liable for punitive
damages under the LMRDA for actual malice or reckless or wanton indifference to the
rights of its members. Bise v. Electrical Workers Local 1969, 618 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3226 (1980).
The NLRB's principal concern in fashioning remedies for unfair labor practices has
been the public's interest in effectuating labor law policies, rather than the wrong done. See
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 n.8 (1967). Accord, IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 49 n.12
(1979). Therefore, historically the Board has been reluctant to exercise its remedial author-
ity to award damages to unions and employers. Recent decisions, however, suggest a new
attitude on the part of the Board may be developing. A union may recover organizing costs
upon proof of a sufficient nexus between the employer's illegal conduct and an extraordinary
increase in the union's organizing expenses. See Tiidee Prod. Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234, 1236
(1972), enforced as modified, International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d
349, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also NLRB v. Food Stores Employees Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 8
(1974); Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1045 (8th Cir. 1976). Also, a union
may recover lost dues attributable to an employer's wrongful refusal to execute an agree-
ment containing union security and check-off provisions. See Cheese Barn, Inc., 222
N.L.R.B. 418, 421 (1976). Recovery of dues under the RLA was approved in Bangor & A.
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 422 F.2d 812, 822-23 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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To meet the appropriateness standard, an award of damages
also must be judicially manageable; there must be no insurmounta-
ble problems of judicial evaluation or ascertainment. In Denver &
Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men,'14 the district court used as the appropriate measure of dam-
ages the revenue from traffic lost to the carrier.115 Under section
301 of the LMRA, damages for breach of collective bargaining
agreement no-strike obligations include all losses that are the natu-
ral, direct, and proximate consequences of the breach.'1" These
damages may be determined by the-court through just and reason-
able inferences derived from the evidence presented.""' Specific
items that may be recovered under section 301 include overhead
costs to which productive labor was not allocated because of the
In Graphic Arts Int'l, Local 280, 235 N.L.R.B. 1084 (1978), enforced, 596 F.2d 904 (9th
Cir. 1979), the union failed to bargain in good faith by unlawfully inducing the employer to
withdraw from a multiemployer bargaining unit, to the employer's financial detriment. The
Board ordered that the employer be made whole for any financial expenditures made under
the individual labor agreement which it would not have had to make under the multiem-
ployer contract.
The authorities are split as to whether public employers may recover damages for un-
lawful strikes by public employees. Compare Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena
Federation of Teachers, Local 1050, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1977) (damages
awarded) and Missouri v. Kansas City Firefighters, 585 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. App. 1979) (same)
with Lamphere Schools v. Federation of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 252 N.W.2d 818 (1977)
(damages remedy rejected as inconsistent with the exclusive state statutory remedy of dis-
charge). The Lamphere court cited National Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 431 F.
Supp. 53, 54 (S.D. Fla. 1976), as support for its conclusion that a damages remedy is ex-
traordinary and may inflame labor-management relations. 400 Mich. at 132, 252 N.W.2d at
131. The court therefore concluded it should not be implied without a clear expression of
legislative intent. As discussed above, however, the decision in National Airlines, a product
of Louisville & Nashville Railway Co. v. Brown, stands on questionable analytical grounds.
See notes 55-62 & accompanying text supra.
In a strike context, public entities also may have available to them common law tort
suits for damages, at least when the injury sustained arises out of water pollution caused by
an unlawful strike. See State v. City and County of San Francisco, 94 Cal. App. 3d 522, 156
Cal. Rptr. 542 (1979); Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1974).
114. 58 L.R.R.M. 2568 (D. Colo. 1965).
115. Id. at 2570.
116. See Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 967 (3d
Cir. 1975); Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 181 F. Supp. 809, 820-22 (N.D.
Iowa 1960). The Eazor court observed that strikes are intended to cause economic injury to
employers. 520 F.2d at 969.
117. See Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Local 1104, Elec. Workers, 496 F.2d 954, 957 (8th Cir.
1974); Operating Eng'rs Local 653 v. Bay City Erection Co., 300 F.2d 270, 272-73 (5th Cir.
1962); United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 389 (8th Cir. 1953); W.L. Mead,
Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25, 129 F. Supp. 313, 317 (D. Mass. 1955), af'd, 230 F.2d 576 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
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strike, including salaries of idle workers,118 goodwill,"" and lost
profits. 120 Thus, in strike situations, quantification of carrier dam-
ages is not a barrier to implication of such a remedy for breach of a
statutory duty.
The Sufficiency of Equitable Relief
The next inquiry in the determination of whether to imply a
damages remedy is whether equitable relief would be inadequate to
protect the injured party's rights.12' Application of this criterion
brings mixed results, but, on balance, it appears that injunctive re-
lief alone is insufficient to safeguard the carrier's rights to contin-
ued operations.
Injunctive relief against an unlawful strike may sufficiently
protect the carrier's right to continue operations if the strike is
short and the employees return to work upon notice or service of
the injunction. 22 A brief strike would be inconvenient, but perhaps
no more so than any delay caused by mechanical difficulties or ad-
118. United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 387-88 (8th Cir. 1953); Struc-
tural Steel & Ornamental Iron Ass'n v. Local 545, Bridge Workers, 172 F. Supp. 353, 362
(D.N.J. 1959); W.L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25, 129 F. Supp. 313, 317 (D. Mass.
1955), aff'd, 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956); Alcoa S.S. Co. v.
Conerford, 17 Lab. Ca2.. 65,480 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
119. Plumbers Local 598 v. Dillon, 255 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1958); W.L. Mead, Inc. v.
Teamsters Local 25, 129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 1955), ajf'd, 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
120. Eazor Express, Inc., v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 968 (3d
Cir. 1975); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. UMW, 436 F.2d 551, 561 (6th Cir. 1970); United Steel-
workers v. CCI Corp., 395 F.2d 529, 533 (10th Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1019 (1969);
Plumbers Local 598, 255 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1958); W.L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25,
129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 1955), af'd, 230 F.2d 576 (1st. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 802
(1956). For an excellent general discussion of compensatory damages recoverable in a § 301
suit, see California Trucking Ass'n v. Teamsters Local 70, 94 L.R.R.M. 2981, 3000 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
Commentators have suggested that employer losses on account of strikes traditionally
have been underestimated and should include prestrike damages from productivity loss and
poststrike damages in the form of overtime expense and lost customers. See J. HrcHINSON,
MANAGEMENT UNDER STRIKE CONDITIONS 56-60 (1966) [hereinafter cited as HUTCHINSON];
Imberman, Strikes Cost More than You Think, HARv. Bus. REv., May/June, 1979, at 133.
121. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979). This requirement appears to be the
converse of the traditional test for injunctive relief-lack of an adequate remedy at law. See
generally DOBBS, supra note 34, § 2.5.
122. Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure obligates obedience to a court
injunction upon notice of its terms, even though proper service may not have been effected.
See generally Regal Knit Wear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945); EEOC v. International
Longshoreman's Ass'n, 541 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1976).
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verse weather conditions.123 Moreover, a brief strike may have a
salutary effect on labor-management relations, as labor is able to
deliver a message to management, yet management may rely on
the legal authority of the court for vindication of its right to con-
tinue operations.124 Acknowledging such a principle, however,
might involve misuse of the judicial process and may breed benign
contempt for the Act's no-strike duties. Employees and unions
may feel free to engage in some unlawful conduct because the
sanctions are no greater than a back-to-work order. Under estab-
lished law, the same would not be true for the carrier. When the
carrier must pay compensatory damages as part of restoring the
status quo, injured parties may recover from the date the unlawful
change in the status quo occurred.
Most importantly, equitable relief is insufficient where the un-
lawful strike is prolonged or where obedience to an an anti-strike
injunction is delayed. An extended carrier shut-down brings all the
consequential damages traditionally suffered by businesses which
cannot operate in strike situations. 2 ' If labor does not respond
promptly to an injunction, the carrier's only legal recourse is to
seek contempt penalties from the court. 2 ' Courts have been reluc-
tant, however, to issue contempt penalties in labor disputes in the
absence of egregious conduct.12 7 In any event, contempt usually is
123. This may not be true of frequent or systemwide strikes or where the carrier plays
an integral role in a finely tuned industrial production "line." For example, an automobile
manufacturer may depend upon regular rail or air transportation service between a manu-
facturing plant of component parts and an assembly plant. Without a large inventory, even
a brief strike could result in the idling of one or two shifts, injuring not only the manufac-
turer but also the carrier's long-term standing as a dependable provider of transportation
services. See N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. SCHILLING, THE IMPACT OF STRIKEs 156-59, 248-49 (1954);
Kahn, supra note 9, at 352. See also Ashley, D. & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d
1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1980). Also, a rail carrier may be liable in damages to shippers for
breach of its duty to provide transportation upon request and adequate car service under
the Interstate Commerce Act, even if beset by labor difficulties. Id. at 1370-71.
124. Professor Imberman suggests that poor communication between an employer and
its workforce has been a prime cause of noneconomic strikes. See Imberman, Strikes Cost
More than You Think, H~av. Bus. REv., May/June, 1979, at 133. See also E. HILLER, THE
STRIKE: A STUDY IN COLLECTIVE ACTION 25-30, 266-77 (1928).
125. See text accompanying notes 114-20 supra.
126. Contempt penalties may be in the form of compensatory fines for the plaintiff
carrier, criminal fines, or incarceration to vindicate the authority of the court. Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 443 (1911); Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelwork-
ers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1342-47 (3d Cir. 1976); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. United
States, 411 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1969).
127. For examples of what conduct courts consider as justifying a contempt citation,
see Longshoreman Local 129 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64 (1967);
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riot a viable remedy because the contumacious party may cleanse
himself or herself of contempt by complying with the injunction.12
Consequently, the employees may interrupt the carrier's opera-
tions for several days at a time without sanction, so long as the
back-to-work order eventually is obeyed. In the interim, the carrier
may have incurred a serious and uncompensated loss of traffic,
profits, and good will, as well as continued overhead expenses for
which no productive labor has been contributed. Thus, injunctive
relief alone does not adequately protect the carrier's rights to unin-
terrupted operations and is insufficient to foster respect for and
use of RLA procedures.129
Restitutionary remedies also are insufficient to safeguard a
carrier's right to uninterrupted operations. Restitution normally
prevents unjust enrichment to the wrongdoer.130 Although restitu-
tion may include monetary relief, that moretary recovery is mea-
United States Steel Corp. v. Fraternal Ass'n of Steel Haulers, 601 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1979);
Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. v. Local 8460, UMW, 597 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1979); Cedar
Coal Co. v. UMW, 560 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1977); Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMW, 551 F.2d
695 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers,
545 F.2d 1336 (3d Cir. 1976); Windsor Coal Co. v. District 6, UMW, 530 F.2d 312 (4th Cir.
1976); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Bangor & A. R.R., 380 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir.),
cert denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); United States v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 96 F.
Supp. 428 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
Even when contempt penalties have been issued they often are insufficient to compen-
sate for the entire loss. See, e.g., Peabody Coal Co. v. Local 1734, UMW, 543 F.2d 10, 13
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977) (fine of $13,000; damages estimated at
$400,000); Long Island R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 298 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D.N.Y.
1969) (fine of $100,000; losses estimated at $409,000).
128. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
129. Under § 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), a participant employee in
an unlawful strike loses his or her "protected" status under that Act and may be replaced
should the employer wish to continue operations. There is no corresponding provision under
the RLA, although in arbitration under the Act, participation in an unlawful strike is cause
for discipline, including discharge. See Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. REA Express, N.R.A.B.
(3d Div. 1974) (Eischen, Arb.); Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Penn Central Transp. Co.,
N.R.A.B. (3d Div. 1973) (Brent, Arb.); IBEW v. Illinois Central Gulf Ry., N.R.A.B. (2d Div.
1968) (Ives, Arb.); Machinists v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., N.R.A.B. (2d Div. 1972) (McGovern,
Arb.). See also F. ELKOURI & A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 644-45 (3d ed. 1973).
Replacement of unlawful strikers under the RLA may not be viable because time-con-
suming collective bargaining agreement discipline procedures may have to be complied with
prior to the time an employee may be discharged. Replacement of strikers also has been
criticized for its adverse effect on ongoing labor-management relations and on collective bar-
gaining in general. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 n.17
(1970) (citing the A.B.A. LABOR RELATIONS LAW SECTION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ATKINSON-
SINCLAIR COMMITTE §§ 226, 242 (1963)).
130. See generally DOBBS, supra note 34, § 1.1. See also Janingan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d
781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965).
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sured by the wrongdoer's gain, rather than by the injured party's
loss.131 Monetary restitution thus does not substitute for a dam-
ages remedy. In the context of a labor dispute, restitution conceiv-
ably might be measured by the economic gains achieved by labor
through an unlawful strike. The future gains, however, probably
are too speculative. Moreover, restitution could not compensate for
carrier losses suffered from the strike itself.1 3 2 Therefore, restitu-
tion is not a proper remedy to "obviate the harm" resulting from
the interruption to the carrier's operations.
National Labor Policy and Carrier Recovery of
Damages
The labor union in American legal history has developed from
a "criminal conspiracy" of limited influence to an established and
powerful social institution.,33 Similarly, national labor policy has
developed from imposing sanctions against labor to promoting la-
bor unions as combinations for the regulation of work conditions
through collective bargaining.'" The role of the courts has been to
enforce the labor laws in a manner reflecting the realities of indus-
trial life.135 The reality today-that labor unions are established,
131. See DOBBS, supra note 34, § 1.1; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 4, 150 (1936).
132. The courts in United Indus. Workers of the Seafarers Int'l Union v. Board of
Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 400 F.2d 320, 323-25 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
905 (1969), and Bangor & A. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman & Enginemen, 442
F.2d 812, 820-22 (D.C. Cir. 1971), considered restitutionary relief for the union, but rejected
it as insufficient to restore the employees and the union to the position they would have
been in had the carriers not breached their status quo obligations. Compensatory damages
were necessary to accomplish that end.
133. See generally D. BOK & J. DuNLoP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1970);
R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 1-53 (1974). For a
description of the development of rail and air unions, see H. LEVENSON, C. REHMUS, J.
GOLDBERG & M. KAHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING & TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN
TRANSPORTATION pts. II, IV (1971). The great advance of labor unions in workplace domi-
nance is underscored by an industrial relations specialist's recent observation of manage-
ment attitudes on lawful strikes: "It is the employers in coal, steel, and electrical equip-
ment who now insist on their right to 'take a long strike' as a way of cutting the union down
to size." J. BARBASH, Commentary, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 581 (G. Sommers ed. 1980).
134. See generally D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1970);
R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW (1974).
135. Compare Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 479-89 (1920)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) with NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 48 U.S.L.W.
4765, 4769-70 (1980); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 580-83 (1960); and Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548, 552-53 (1959).
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powerful institutions-is reflected in the development of labor pol-
icy from mere protection of labor organizations to encouragement
of collective bargaining and administrative techniques for peaceful
resolution of industrial disputes,"'6 particularly where those tech-
niques are undertaken voluntarily by the parties.3 7 Perhaps the
most persuasive reason for implying a damages remedy on behalf
of carriers that suffer loss because of unlawful strikes therefore is
the compatibility of that type of relief with national labor policy as
found in the RLA and elsewhere. In IBEW v. Foust,' the Court
recently underscored the appropriateness of that inquiry by stating
that the function of the judiciary is to implement a remedial
scheme that will best facilitate collective bargaining and achieve
industrial peace.139 This includes awarding monetary damages
when appropriate. Although this inquiry, and the inquiry into the
appropriateness of a damages remedy, may appear to overlap, ex-
amination of national labor policy requires inquiry beyond merely
determining whether damages have been awarded by the courts in
the past. The remedy must be tested not only by the existence of
judicial precedent but by its place in the framework for collective
bargaining set by the RLA.
Courts often look to other federal labor laws for assistance in
interpreting the obligations of parties under the RLA because the
general "penumbra of protected conduct" is substantially the
same.1 40 In evaluating what remedies should be awarded by the
136. See Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1969).
137. Id. at 252-53.
138. 442 U.S. 4 (1979).
139. Id. at 47. The Supreme Court often has endorsed considering the policy of the
RLA in determining the "extent and nature" of the legal consequences of duties imposed
under the Act. See IAM v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1963); Turnstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944); Dietrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S.
190, 200, 201 (1940). Accord, Brady v. Trans World Airlines, 401 F.2d 87, 102 (3d Cir. 1968).
The purpose and context of collective bargaining also merits "special heed" in the enforce-
ment of obligations under the LMRA. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 567 (1960). See also NLRA, § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); LMRA, § 1, 29 U.S.C.
§ 141 (1976).
For Justice Harlan and Professor Feller, matching the remedy to the policy of the stat-
ute is uniquely within the province of the judiciary and is the most important inquiry in the
determination of whether a remedy should be implied. See notes 79, 92 supra.
140. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
384 (1969) (Court discussed secondary pressure under the RLA). The Jacksonville Terminal
Court described the NLRA as "the only existing congressional expression as to the permissi-
ble bounds of economic combat." In the law developed under that Act resides the "relevant
corpus of 'national labor policy."' Id. at 383. See also Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
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courts to promote the policy of the RLA and national labor policy,
it is instructive to refer to the law developed under the LMRA. In
Galveston Wharves, for example, the court referred to analogous
situations under the LMRA to support an award of damages for
carrier violation of the major dispute procedures of the RLA.141
Similarly, in Foust, the Court, in measuring the compatibility of a
punitive damages remedy for breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion with national labor policy, relied on treatment of that issue by
both the NLRB in unfair labor practice situations and by the
courts under section 303 of the LMRA.142 Finally, the law devel-
oped under section 301 of the LAMRA 143 is helpful in considering
the propriety of awarding damages for violations of RLA
obligations.144
The legislative history of section 301 reveals that Congress in-
tended to promote the stabilization of industrial relations by mak-
ing collective bargaining agreements enforceable in the federal and
state courts. Congress was particularly concerned with the enforce-
ment of "no-strike" clauses in collective agreements, because it
had concluded that effective collective bargaining depended upon
imposing mutual responsibility on both labor and management.
Section 301 was added to the national labor laws to subject labor
organizations that made collective agreements with employers to
the same judicial remedies and processes for violations of agree-
ments as those applicable to all other citizens.1 45
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 275 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 404 F.2d 938 (2d
Cir. 1969) (court held that the NLRA provides a "cogent analogy" for interpretation of
obligations under the RLA). The Jacksonville Terminal Court did not endorse wholesale
importation of NLRA precedent into interpretation of the RLA, however, noting that be-
cause of the many differences between the two statutes, "even rough analogies" must be
drawn with care. 394 U.S. at 383.
141. 400 F.2d at 323, 326.
142. 442 U.S. at 52.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (providing access to the courts to enforce collective bar-
gaining agreements).
144. After reviewing the history of judicial enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ment duties and obligations, Professor Feller concluded: "The [Supreme] Court has created
and defined a set of substantially identical remedies and limitations under both [the RLA
and § 301 of the LMRA]." Feller, supra note 12, at 716-18. This discussion was limited to
breaches of duties under § 3 of the RLA. Later, Professor Feller stated that the issue of
whether damages are available for strikes in violation of the RLA was a matter of statutory
construction. Id. at 800.
145. See'S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st. Sess. 15-18 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE LABoR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407 (1948). The
Senate Committee noted that employers were frustrated in enforcing collective bargaining
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* Section 301 itself, however, does not authorize damages ac-
tions against labor unions. It merely grants jurisdiction in the fed-
eral courts over suits for breach of contract between labor and
management. As described earlier, the questions of jurisdiction,
right of action, and remedies are separate and distinct inquiries for
the courts.14 The courts nonetheless have construed section 301 as
authorizing the development of federal substantive law to govern
actions under section 301.147 When first considering cases arising
under section 301, the courts faced challenges similar to those
presented in the first cases arising under the RLA because section
301 did not provide remedies for suits brought under that section.
Not surprisingly, the courts implied whatever remedies, including
damages, that were necessary and appropriate to vindication of the
congressional scheme.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,'4" the Supreme
Court, mindful of the federal labor policy that Congress intended
to foster by the LMRA, concluded that Congress intended that
sanctions be applied for breaches of collective bargaining duties,
notwithstanding the lack of express remedies in the statute. The
Court concluded that common law principles should be applied by
the federal courts under section 301.1,9 Just as it had concluded in
Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co., the Court noted that federal
agreements because of the many state laws making it difficult, if not impossible, to sue
effectively and to recover a judgment against an unincorporated voluntary association, such
as a labor union, that in many jurisdictions lacked jural existence. The Senate Committee,
and later the Congress, concluded that it was not enough to permit the parties to invoke the
processes of the NLRB; Congress wanted to give the parties a right of action in federal
court: "statutory recognition of the collective bargaining agreement as a valid, binding, and
enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a higher degree of re-
sponsibility upon the parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote industrial
peace." Id. at 17.
See also H.R. RaP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66, reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1135; H.R. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st. Sess. 6, 8, 46 (1947), reprinted in 1
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 01 THE LABOR RELATIONS MANAGEMENT Acm, 1947, at 292
(1948). See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-56 (1957); Asso-
ciation of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 443-49
(1955). Recently, the intent of § 301 was characterized as the restoration of "equilibrium" in
industrial relations. Delaware Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 326, 624 F.2d 1182,
1193 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosen, J., concurring).
146. See notes 34-36 & accompanying text supra.
147. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957). Agree-
ments negotiated pursuant to the RLA receive similar treatment. See IAM v. Central Air-
lines, 372 U.S 682, 690-92 (1963).
148. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
149. Id. at 456.
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labor statutes did not cover all situations and that judicially devel-
oped remedies were necessary for proper enforcement of those
laws: "Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory
mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be
solved by looking at the policy of legislation and fashioning a rem-
edy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial interven-
tiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem." 150 The
judiciary has had little difficulty in fulfilling the mandate of Lin-
coln Mills that judicial remedies, including damages under section
301, be determined on a case by case basis.151
National labor policy, under both the RLA and LMRA, favors
free collective bargaining and the peaceful adjustment of industrial
disputes. Each statute preserves the right to engage in economic
action when pursuing bargaining objectives. Under the LMRA, the
parties are free to resort to economic action at any time, unless
that freedom has been restricted by a no-strike or mandatory arbi-
tration provision in a collective bargaining agreement.1 52 Such pro-
visions postpone economic action until expiration of the collective
agreement. Under the RLA, the timing of the right to resort to
economic action emphasizes the Act's policy to prevent undue in-
terruptions to a carrier's operations during efforts to apply the col-
lective agreement and during efforts at modifying the agreement. 153
150. Id. at 457. See also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). In
Courtney, the Court, after examining the legislative history of § 301, stated: "Congress de-
liberately chose to leave the enforcement of collective agreements 'to the usual processes of
the law."' Id. at 513. Accord, William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S.
12, 18 (1974).
151. For a discussion of damages, see notes 116-20 & accompanying text supra. See
also Electrical Workers v. Electrical Serv., Inc., 535 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
832 (1976); Bond v. Teamsters Local 823, 521 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Tippett v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C. 1970). For the fashioning of remedies other
than damages, see Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974) (injunction); Warehouse-
men Union v. Standard Brands, Inc., 560 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977) (remedy of specific en-
forcement); Emmanuel v. Omaha Carpenters Dist. Council, 560 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1977)
(attorneys' fees); Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975)
(remedy of vacation of arbitration award); Brannon v. Warn Bros. Inc., 508 F.2d 115 (9th
Cir. 1974) (remedy of accounting); H.K. Porter Co. v. Local 37, Steelworkers, 400 F.2d 691
(4th Cir. 1968) (remedy of specific enforcement); Automobile Transp., Inc. v. Ferdnance, 420
F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (remedy of reinstatement). The citation of these cases is not
exhaustive, but merely illustrative of the remedies that have been thus far awarded by the
courts under § 301.
152. See NLRA, § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976). See also Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414
U.S. 368 (1974).
153. See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
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Notwithstanding these differences, it appears that the abroga-
tion of the no-strike obligations under each Act merits the award
of damages to an injured party. The availability of such an award
under the LMRA is contractual because the no-strike obligation
normally arises from express terms of a collective agreement, or, in
the case of a mandatory arbitration provision, is implied by the
courts."" Courts have awarded damages for violating no-strike ob-
ligations in order to promote greater responsibility and discipline
in the collective bargaining process. Although the no-strike obliga-
tion under the RLA is statutory, it deserves the same, if not
greater, protection as the contractual duty under the LMRA.1 5
The award of damages to a carrier to compensate it for a union's
failure to comply with RLA obligations 156 would promote the na-
tional labor policy of fostering the peaceful adjustment of indus-
trial disputes by discouraging union abrogation of its duties under
the Act and thus promote industrial peace by ensuring the carrier's
continued operation while disputes are adjusted. The same mutual
responsibility in collective bargaining which section 301 seeks to
advance, and which the courts have sought to secure by awarding
damages for violation of no-strike provisions in collective bargain-
ing agreements, would be advanced if carriers were allowed recov-
ery of damages for strikes violating the RLA no-strike duties.157
154. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
155. The Supreme Court has endorsed this conclusion with respect to enforcement of
the RLA's minor dispute arbitration duty. See Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R., 406 U.S.
320, 323 (1972).
156. National labor policy favors limitations of damages to redress actual loss by the
injured party. See, e.g., IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 (1979). Professor Dobbs describes
damages as "substitutionary relief" -monetary recovery to take the place of the loss. See
DoBBs, supra note 34, § 3.1.
157. Early in this century, when labor unions were fighting for recognition, Justice
Brandeis contended that financial responsibility for unlawful actions would be in the long-
term best interests of labor unions. In an address delivered to the Economic Club of Boston
on December 4, 1902, he stated: "The unions should take the position squarely that they
are amenable to law, prepared to take the consequences if they transgress, and must show
that they are in full sympathy with the spirit of our people, whose political system rests
upon the proposition that this is a government of law, and not of men .... I can conceive
of no expenditure of money by a union which could bring so large a return as the payment
of compensation for some wrong actually committed by it. Any such payment would go far
in curbing the officers and members of the union from future transgressions of the law, and
it would, above all, establish the position of the union as a responsible agent in the commu-
nity, ready to abide by the law. This would be of immense advantage to the union in all its
operations." Address by Louis D. Brandeis to the Economic Club of Boston (Dec. 4, 1902),
quoted in 93 CONG. REc. 4410 (1947) (remarks of Senator Smith during debate on LMRA).
Senator Smith described Justice Brandeis as "one of the greatest defenders of the rights of
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Conclusion
This Article has advocated two ways by which the courts may
fashion a damages remedy for carriers injured by unlawful strikes
under the RLA. First, an analytical framework for awarding dam-
ages is provided by the mutual obligations of labor and manage-
ment to maintain the status quo until the procedures of the RLA
have been exhausted. This status quo obligation is reciprocal and
coterminous; labor may not strike, and management may not uni-
laterally change rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Dam-
ages have been awarded to employees and unions for a carrier's
breach of its status quo obligation. Because the status quo obliga-
tion is reciprocal and coterminous, an award of damages to the car-
rier for labor's breach of its no-strike obligation should be implied
in the Act and should be available to carriers to maintain the sym-
metry of the status quo obligation.
Second, the propriety of allowing a damages remedy is found
in the application of the general judicial test for determining
whether a damages remedy is available for breach of a federal stat-
utory duty. Legislative history reveals that both Congress and rail
labor anticipated that sanctions would be imposed on any party
that violated the RLA. Remedies and sanctions for breach of the
Act were left for the courts to develop on a case by case basis.
Equitable relief alone is insufficient to safeguard a carrier's right to
continue operations. An injunction, restitution, or in aggravated in-
stances, contempt penalties will not adequately compensate for the
losses sustained by a struck carrier. Damages for breach of a statu-
tory duty traditionally were available at common law. Damages
have been awarded by the courts to unions for breach of contrac-
tual no-strike obligations and for breach of other RLA duties. Cal-
culation of the amount of damages is not difficult.
Each of these theories supporting a carrier's right to recover
damages is consistent with the national labor policy favoring mu-
tuality of responsibility at the bargaining table. Free collective bar-
gaining requires that labor and management be responsible for
their actions, including monetary liability when appropriate. An
award of damages to rail and air carriers for labor union breach of
the working man," and the context of his speech as "trying to bring about a right relation-
ship between management and labor." 93 CONG. R.c. 4410 (1947) (remarks of Senator
Smith) (emphasis added). See 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1145-46 (1948).
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the voluntarily assumed no-strike obligation is consistent with con-
temporary labor policy recognizing labor unions as mature partici-
pants in collective bargaining and with enforcing labor laws to pro-
mote peaceful adjustments of industrial disputes according to
voluntarily agreed to procedures.
In articulating these theories for a damages remedy to protect
a carrier's right to continue operations, damages are not advocated
as the "right" or "true" remedy. The development and promotion
of appropriate national labor policy is better served by focusing on
the proper balance of power between labor and management rather
than on vague notions of good and evil.1 5 8  Implying a damages
remedy also does not suggest a compromise of labor's cherished
right to strike. There is no general federal anti-strike policy.159 A
strike is merely one method of securing agreement between labor
and management.160 The right to strike is preserved by federal la-
bor law; expressly by the LMRA, 61 and by implication under the
RLA. 1 62 These proposals simply seek to articulate an analytical
framework for a remedial structure that reflects the proper balance
of power between labor and management provided by the RLA.
The Act itself furthers the public interest in continuous trans-
portation services by postponing labor's ability to exercise its right
to strike until the Act's procedures are exhausted and, conse-
quently, confers on rail and air carriers a right to uninterrupted
operations until those procedures have been exhausted. That pub-
lic interest, and the RLA's balance of power between labor and
management, is threatened, not by lawful strike activity, which is a
vital part of the institution of collective bargaining, but by strikes,
unlawful under the Act, which disrupt the collective bargaining re-
lationships established by the Act's obligations.
158. St. Antoine, National Labor Policy: Reflections and Distortions of Social Jus-
tice, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 535, 536-37 (1980). The Supreme Court also has observed that in
particular circumstances, damages may exacerbate poor labor-management relations. Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248-49 (1970). Accord, Gateway Coal
Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 381-82 n.14 (1974).
159. See Buffalo Forge v. Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397,409 (1976). See also Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 376-77, 384-85 (1969).
160. COMM1TTEE FOR ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LA-
BOR POLICY 86-91 (1961); HUTCHINSON, supra note 120, at 11. The Committee did conclude,
however, that strikes often impede the ability of the parties to consider problems of great
complexity with long-term adverse effect on the public interest.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976).
162. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
379 (1969). See also note 20 supra.
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Strikes, legal or illegal, are inherently coercive. lea Strikes have
effects far beyond the immediate economic impact to the struck
enterprise,1 6 4 especially on long term labor-management rela-
tions.65 The coercive effects of illegal strikes are exacerbated if rail
and air carriers cannot preserve their right to uninterrupted opera-
tions through resort to the courts. Over time, a carrier will become
aware of the inadequacies of equitable relief and feel compelled to
make concessions to prevent or terminate unlawful strikes for
which it will incur losses without hope of compensation. There will
be less incentive for labor to avoid striking if concessions can be
secured through an unlawful strike without attendant monetary li-
ability. This state of affairs departs from the balance of power
between labor and management intended by the RLA's reciprocal,
coterminous status quo obligations and its procedures for adjusting
disputes. It also interferes with the public interest in continuous
transportation service.
A remedial structure to enforce the RLA no-strike obligation
should recognize the inherently coercive nature of strikes and con-
tain within it remedies to regulate effectively the conduct of labor
and management under the status quo and dispute adjustment ob-
ligations. Such an approach would promote collective bargaining
and facilitate industrial peace.1 66 National labor policy has devel-
oped from protection of the nascent labor movement to promotion
of techniques for resolution of disputes.1 67 A damages remedy will
serve the interests of labor and management in responsible collec-
tive bargaining and peaceful dispute adjustment.
163. Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 967 (3d Cir.
1975). See also E. HILE, Ti STRUE, A STUDY IN COLLEcTIVE ACTION 12, 16 (1928);
HUTCHINSON, supra note 120.
164. See generally HUTCHINSON, supra note 120. For a description of the effects of
strikes in the rail and air transportation industries, see N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. SCHILLING,
THE IMPACT OF STRIKES (1954); Cullen, Strike Experience Under the Railway Labor Act, in
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT 50, ch. VII (C. Rehmus ed. 1976); Kahn, supra note 9, at 352.
165. HUTCHINSON, supra note 120, at 38-41, 56-57. See COMMITTE FOR ECONOMiC DE-
vELOPHENT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 86-91, 108-10 (1961).
166. Professor St. Antoine, after noting that rights have substance and meaning only
insofar as they are backed by effective remedies, suggested that inadequate remedies frus-
trate full enforcement of the labor laws; recalcitrant employers and unions sometimes view
minor penalties as a license fee for certain practices. St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor
Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1039 (1968). See also Feller, supra note 12, at 28.
167. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).
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